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[S.F. No. 16249. In Bank. JUly 22, 1943.J

BLANCHE HADLEY STRONG, Appellant, v. MURIEL F.
STRONG, Respondent.
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ing that no action to avoid a conveyance of community real
property in which the wife has not joined shall be commenced
after the expiration of one year from the time of recording
such instrument, where the deed to plaintiff was recorded several years before commencement of the action. It was immaterialthat the wife had brought no action to avoid plaintiff's
deed, since statutes of limitation, although commonly phrased
in terms restricting only the commencement of actions" apply
to causes of action raised by the defendant.
[5] ld. - Property - Title to Community Propertr-Actions to
Avoid Transfers-Time to Sue.-,.-The recipient of, a deedexecuted by the husband alone obtains a voidable interest,and
the object of the one-year limitation in Civ. Code, § 172a, is.to
make that interest absolute after that time, just as statutes
barring actions for the recovery of real property are usually
construed to create a new title in the adverse possessor and to
terminate the interest of the paper titleholder.
[6] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Necessity of Pleading Statute.-A party relying on the iiefense of the statute of limit~
tions must plead it. ,

[7] Pleading-Issues and Proof-Ownership.-A plea of ownership is sufficient to permit proof of a title acquired as a result
,of the running of the statute of ,limitations.
[8] Quieting Title-Pleading-Fraud.-The general rule that fraud \
must be specifically pleaded applies particularly to quiet title
actions.
[9] Husband and Wife-Actions-Pleading:, Quieting Title-Is-:
sues.-In an action to quiet title to property acquired by defendant's divorced husband during the' marriage. and later
deeded by him to plaintiff, his mother, any rights thatdefendant might have to the cancellation of the deed or to the declaration of a constructive trust are, entirely equitable, and
such rights cannot be established in a quiet title action when
the pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting defendant's ownership and denying that of plaintiff.
'

[101 Fraud:--Findings.-A judgment is not supported by proof of
fraud if there is no finding of fraud.
[11] Quieting Title-Issues-Fraudulent Conveyances.-The rules
of pleading governing cases of conveyances in fraud of creditors have no bearing on a quiet title suit which does not involve such a conveyance.
[8] See 12 Ca1.Jur. 800; 22 Ca,1.Jur. 152; 24 Am.Jur. 71.
[10] See 24 Cal.Jur. 935.
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[12] Fraudulent Conveyances-Validity of Transfer as Against
Creditors: Sheriffs-Actions-Plcading-Issues and Proof.A creditor may levy t'xecution on the property fraudull'ntly
conveyed itS if there had been no convey:mee, and a shrriff
who is sued for conversion hy virtue of such Itn execution may
prove, under It denial of the grantee's title, that the conveyance

was fraudulent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Frank M. Ogden, Judge. Reversed.
, Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Kenneth J. Carey and Henderson & Henderson for Appellant.
Snook & Snook & Chase and Samuel J. Chase for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brought by plaintiff
Blanche Hadley Strong against defendant Muriel F. Strong
to quiet title to a house and lot in the city of Oakland. The
property was conveyed on December 16, 1925, by June Wadey
to Lester H. Strong, at that time the husband of defendant
Muriel F. Strong, and the deed was recorded on January 6,
1926. The purchase was made at least in part with community funds. In 1932 a grant deed was executed and delivered to plaintiff Blanche Hadley Strong, mother of Lester
~. Strong. Both Lester H. Strong and Muriel F. Strong
SIgned and acknowledged the deed, but only Lester H. Strong
was .named therein as grantor. Muriel F. Strong .was induced
to SIgn the deed by her husband's representatIOns that he
was in financial difficulty, that the conveyance was made for
the protection of their home, and that there would shortly
be a reconveyance to them. ,The deed was recorded on April
14, 1932. On January 14, 1938, Muriel F. Strong was granted
a divorce and was awarded the house and lot, formerly the
home of the family and subsequently the home of her two
children and herself. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment
in favor of the defendant.
The divorce decree could pass no interest to defendant
unless the deed could not be enforced against her,so inquiry
must first be directed at the effectiveness of the conveyance
to plaintiff in 1932. [1] Defendant invokes section 172a of
the Civil Code, providing that the wife' must join with the
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husband in executing any instrument by which "community
real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer
period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered.
. . ." Defendant contends that in order to join in executing
the deed the wife must be named therein as grantor.
Two e~rlY cases, lngoldsby v. Jv.an, 12 Cal. 564, and Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138, involved legislation providing that
a conveyance of the wife's separate property must 'be signed
by the husband, that such a conveyance must be by jo!nt
deed, and that it must be executed by husband and wife.
(Hittel General Laws of California, (1872) pp. 103, 105,
516.) This court held that the husband complied with these
statutes by signing the deed, on the ground that it would be
unreasonable to expect a husband who had no interest to
convey to be a formal grantor. It declared that. the husband
was required to join merely to give or withhold his assent to
the transfer, and that he gave his assent by signing the deed.
The same reasoning applies to Civil Code section 172a.
When that section was adopted in 1917, a wife had no legal
interest in the community property (Spreckels v. Spreckels,
172 Cal. 775 [158 P. 537] ; Estate of Dargie, 179 Cal. 418
[177 P. 165]; Lahaney v. Lahaney, 208 Cal. 323 [281 P. 67] ;
McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557 [269 P. 519]; Stewart v.
Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 [249 P. 197]), and since she could grant
no interest, the Legislature could hardly have intended her
to act as grantor. [2] The rights of the husband and wife
must be measured by the statutes in effect when the property
was acquired (McKay v. Lauriston, :supra; Ldhaneyv. La~
haney, supra),' and as the property in this case was acquired
before the adoption in 1927 of Civil Code section 161a
providing that the wife has a "present, existing, and equal"
interest in community property, the wife adequately signified
her consent to the transfer by the husband by ,'signing the
deed. (Riley v. Gordon, 137 Cal.App. 311 [30 P.2d 617];
see 3 Cal.Jur.TenYr.Supp. 593.) Since the provisions of
section 172a were the same in 1927 as in 1917 with respect
to a wife's joining in a conveyance of community property,
it is unlikely that any alteration in this meaning was intended in 1927.
Defendant relies on Oordano v. Wright, 159 Cal. 610 [115
P.227, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1044], Roberts v. Abbott, 48 Cal.
App. 779 [192 P. 345], and Ohilds v. Newfield, 136 Cal.App.
217 [28 P.2d 924], holding that if several persons sign a
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d'aed, some of whom are not named therein as grantors, only
those so named convey their interest in the property granted.
In distinguishing Ingoldsby v. Juan, and Dentzel v. Waldie,
however, the court in Cordano v. Wright made it clear that
those cases were correctly decided, and that a person without
any legal interest in the property granted could by signing
.8 deed comply with a statute requiring that he join in its
execution. The rule in Cordano v. Wright had its origin in
the fact that at common law deeds were not signed but sealed,
and identification of the grantor was therefore required in
the body of the deed. Even after seals were replaced by
signatures and t;he rule became unnecessary it was still applied
mechanically. (Elliot v. Sleeper, 2 N.H. 525.) Several courts,
however, have refused to adhere to the rule now that it has
lost its reason for being. (Sterling v. Park, 129 Ga. 309 [58
S.E. 828, 121 Am.St.Rep. 224, 12 Ann.Cas. 201, 13 L.R.A.N.S.
298] ; Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 600 [150 N.W. 160, Ann.Cas.
1916E 518, L.R.A. 1915D 196]; Hrouska v. Janke, 66 Wis.
252 [28 N.W. 166]; Elliot v. Sleeper, supra. See Blake v.
Hedriok, 94 W.Va. 761 [120 S.E. 906]; Runyan v. Snyder,
45 Colo. 156 [100 P. 420].) Certainly it should not be applied where there is no occasion for even its mechanical application. [3] The purpose of section 172a was to give a wife
a veto power over conveyances of community property disadvantageous to her (Stewart v. Stewart, supra) and since she
can exercise this power effectively by refusing to sign the
.
deed, there is no need for more elaborate procedure.
[4] Defendant, moreover, asserts her rights under section
17211. too late. At the time the property was acquired this
·section provided that no action to avoid a conveyance of community real property in which the wife had not joined" shall
be commenced after the expiration of one year from the :filing
for record of such instrument in the recorder's office in the
county in which the land is situate." (Stats. 1917, p. 829.)
The deed to plaintiff was recorded several years before the
commencement of this action. It is immaterial that the wife
has brought no action to avoid plaintiff's deed but invokes
section 172a as defendant in a quiet title suit, for statutes
of limitation, although commonly phrased in terms restricting only the commencement of actions (Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
sec. 335 et seq.), apply to causes of action raised by the defendant. (Hermosa Beach etc. Co. v. Law Credit Co., 175 Cal.
493 [166 P. 22] ; Bradbury v. Higginson, 167 Cal. 553 [140
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P. 254] ; Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister [Estate Co.], 3 Cal.2d
740 [47 P.2d 273] ; Bliss v. Sneath, 119 Cal. 526 [51 P. 848]:) .
"A title which will not sustain a declaration will not sustaIn
a plea." (Holmes, J., in Chapin v.Freeland, 142 Mass. 383
[8 N.E. 138, 56 Am.Rep. 701].) Defendant, despite. her plea
of ownership,· seeks in fact to pre.vail on the bas~s. of a ca~
of action to avoid plaintiff's deed, a cause of action on which
the statute has run.
[5] Defendant's argument that the statute should not bar
this cause necessitates the assumption that 1728. should be
construed more strictly than the usual statute of limitations.
The reverse is true. The recipient of a deed executed by the
husband alone obtains a voidable interest. The. object of the
one year limitation in section 172a is to make that·interest
absolute after that time just as statutes barring' actions for
the recovery of real property are usually construed to create
a new title in the adverse possessor and to terminate the
interest of the paper titleholder. (See Ballantine, Title by
Adverse Possession, 32 Harv.L.Rev. 135; Tiffany on Real
Property (3rd ed.) section 1133, et seq.; Restatement: Property, Introductory Note to chapter 15.) It is not reasonable
to suppose that the Legislature intended to make the grantee's
right to the property dependent on the chance of the wife's.
appearing as plaintiff rather than defendant.
It is II.lso contended that plaintiff waived the limitation under 172a on defendant's cause of action. [6] It is true
that a party relying on the defense of the statute of limitations must plead it. (See Union Sugar Co. v. HolUster Estate
Co., 3 Ca1.2d 740 [47 P.2d 273].) [7J Plaintiff, however,
pleaded that she owned the property, and a plea of ownership is
sufficient· to permit proof of a title acquired as a result. of
the running of the statute of limitations. (Jordan v. Beale,
172 Cal. 226 [155 P. 990] ; Carbarino v. Noce, 181 Cal. 125 [183
P. 532, 6 A.L.R. 1433] ; Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484 [137
P. 260] ; Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381 [108 P. 278] ; Montecito Valley Co. v. Santa Barbara, 144 Cal. 578 [77 P. 1113] ;
Merrill v. Hooper, 125 Cal.App. 80 [13 P.2d 786] ; Rowe v.
Wurster, 50 Cal.App. 196 [194 P. 725].)
[8] Defendant contends that the judgment quieting title
in her should be affirmed on the ground that she was induced
by her husband's false representations to sign the deed.Defendant did not plead fraud, however, although the general
22 0.24-18
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rule that fraud must be specifically pleaded (see cases cited
in 12 Cal.Jur. 800, et seq.) applies particularly to quiet title
.actions. (Thompson v. Moore, 8 Ca1.2d 367, 372 [65 P.2d
800, 109 A.L.R. 1027] ; Maison v. Puntenney, 212 Cal. 134,
137-139 [298 P. 33] ; Carpenter v. Smallpage, 220 Cal. 129,
133 [29 P.2d 841, 30 P.2d 995] ; Burris v. Adams, 96 Cal. 664,
.667-668 [31 P. 565] ; Davies v. Symmes, 49 Cal.App.2d 433,
445-446 [122 P.2d 102].) [9] Defendant, moreover, is not the
Jegal owner, for title passed on execution of the deed. (See
cases cited in 12 Cal.Jur. 723.) Any rights that she might
have to the cancellation of the deed or to the declaration of
a constructive trust are entirely equitable (Rocha v. Rocha,
197 Cal. 396 [240 P. 1010] ; Farrar v. Steenbergh, 173 Cal.
94 [159 P.707] ; Freligh v. McGrew, 95 Cal.App. 251 [272
P. 791]; Walsh, Equity, 492), and it is settled that such
rights cannot be established in an action to quiet title when the
pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting de~
fendant's ownership and denying that of plaintiff. (Aalwyn's
Law Institute v. Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 26 [159 P. 158] ; Robinson v.Muir, 151 Cal. 118, 124 [90 P. 521]; County of Los
Angeles v. Hannon, 159 Cal. 37,48 [112 P. 878, Ann.Cas. 1912
B 1065]; Reilly v. Wright, 117 Cal. 77, 80 [48 P. 970].)
[10] In the present case there was not only no pleading,
but no finding of fraud, and a judgment is not supported by
proof of fraud if there is no finding of fraud. (Taylor v.
Taylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ; Floyd v.
Tierra Grande Dev. Co., 51 Cal.App. 654[197 P. 684] ; Code
Civ. Proc.§ 632; see .cases cited in 24 Cal.Jur. 935 et seq.)
Any issue of fraud in this lawsuit entered through the evidence admitted, not through the pleadings. The findings are
made substan~ially in the language of the pleadings and do
not include issues not raised by them. (Taylorv. Taylor, 192
Cal. 71, 81 [218P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074].)
[11] The rules of pleading governing cases of conveyances in fraud of creditors have no bearing on the present
case, which does not involve such a conveyance. (Cf. Howe v.
Johnson, 107 Cal. 67 [40 P. 42] ; Banning v. Marleau, 121 Cal.
240 [53 P. 692] ; Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 [26 P~ .213, 22
Am/St.Rep.310] ; Grum v. Barney, 55 Cal. 254; Bird v. Murphy~ 72 Cal.App. 39 [236 P. 154] ; Sellers v. Neil, 47 Cal.App.
2d 128 [117 P.2d 390].) Such conveyances are void as against
qr~di~ors, under the express terms of Civil Code section 3439,
fueffectwhen the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was
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adopted in 1939, and of Civil Code section 3439.09, in effect
thereafter. [12] A creditor may levy execution on the property as if there had been no conveyance. (Grum v. Barney~
supraj Mason v. Vestal, supraj see Bird v. Murphy, supra),
and a sheriff who is sued for conversion by virtue of such an
execution may prove, under a denial of the grantee '8 title,
that the conveyance was fraudulent. (Howe v. Johnson,
supraj Banning v. Marleau, supraj Mason v. Vestal, supraj
Grum v. Barney, supra.) A conveyance may be in fraud of
creditors because it was a gift by an insolvent donor (Civil
Code § 3439.04), or was designed to put the property beyond
the reach of creditors (Civil Code § 3439.04), or; in the case
of personal property, because it was. not followed by immediate delivery. (Civil Code § 3440.) The fraud that entitles a
party to rescind a transfer, however, is altogether different
for it is based on false representations inducing reliance, and
thus involves different considerations of policy and different
legal consequences.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J. and Schauer, J., concurred.
CURTIS, J.-I dissent. As a preliminary point of discussion it is necessary to advert briefly to the presentation and
?ispositio~ of this litigation in the trial court. The pleadIng~ are In the usua! short form appropriate to quiet title
actIo~s. The. complamt alleges the plaintiff's ownership of
certaIn descrIbed real property. and the defendant's assertion:
of an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff. The defendant
in her answer denies all the averments of the ·complaint
except as. to her adverse claim, which she admits but she
denies that such claim is without right· in this· c~nnection:
defend~nt alleges that she is the owne; and rightfully in
posseSSIOn ·of the property and prays that.title be quieted in.
her. T~e case was tried by the court sitting without a jury.
FollOWIng the general form of the allegations contained in
the parties' respective pleadings, the trial court in· its findings resolved the adverse claims of ownership in favor of the
defendant and judgment was entered in accordance with that·
adjUdication of the title to the property. Such determination
rests upon the inefficacy of the deed of 1932 to sustain the
plaintiff's cause of action.
The following review of the record will demonstrate the
propriety of the trial court's decision: While the defendant
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admitted signing the deed in question, she consistently maintained that she had no intention of "passing the title" or
giving away [her] home" or "passing any interest" to the
plaintiff. It appears that the defendant knew the instrument
was drafted in favor of her mother-in-law, but that because
of her ill health the defendant did not read the document
. and relied solely on her husband's statement that the transaction was "merely for convenience" and a reconveyance by
his mother would immediately follow. Illustrative of the defendant's understanding of the matter are these excerpts from
her testimony: In answer to th'3 question "What did your
husband tell you" when the deed was execlited, the defendant upon direct examination testified: "That he wanted me
to sign this deed to his mother merely for a convenience; that
very shortly it would be put back in my name, and the other
paper I signed [at the same time] he told me that was the
deed giving it back to us. I did not read either document
due to my condition." On cross-examination when queried
as to the identity of the two documents she claimed to have
signed contemporaneously the defendant stated. "One he told
me was giving the house to his mother and the otber was his
mother giving it back to me." Wben asked as to what reason
her husband gave her for negotiating the transfer, the defendant answered: "He said he was in some business difficulty
and he didn't want the home taken from his two children
and his wife-he wanted to safeguard us." Confirmatory of
the defendant's understanding of the affair is tbe fact that
her possession and enjoyment of the property was in nowise
disturbed as the result of this deed. At tbe trial the defendant's husband, Lester H. Strong, admitted that he told the
defendant when she signed the deed that such transfer was
necessary because of financial difficulties.
.
Also of some pertinency in thi., connection is the evidence
relating' to the matter of consideration in support of the disputed conveyance. At the trial the plaintiff attempted to
correlate tbe transaction here involved, with her action some
ei!!ht weeks later in deeding two pieces of real estate to her
son, Lester H. Strollg.Althoul!h the latter was called to
testify on behalf of the plaintiff, he was not asked to corroborate his mother's claim as to the issue of consideration. It
appears that the defendant did not know of these later conveyances to her husband, and she, therefore, was unable to
testify as to their purpose. However, she did state that at
the time in question the plaintiff was financially interested
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in, certain business ventures of ,Lester Ii. Strong and concerned with their successful outcome. On cross-examination
the plaintiff admitted that she frequently gave her son money
or property on which he might obtain loans to relieve pressing
financial obligations. In view of the significant discrepancy
between the respective dates of the mentioned deeds; the nat"
ural as. well as business relationship between the plaintiff
and Lester H. Strong, and theconflic'ting possibilities' as to .
. th~ object of the plaintiff's transfer of realty to her son, the
trIal court, having the advantage of 'observing the demea:nor
of the parties on the witness-stand, apparently elected. to discredit the plaintiff's claim as to the existence of any connection between the successive conveyanceS and concluded that
they were independent transactions, not intended as consid-'
eration one for the other. In accord with the settled rule that
it is within the exclusive province of the triai court to pass
ripon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence, the implied finding against the plaintiff on the issue
of consideration would not be disturbed on appeal.
From this state of the record it can readily be inferred that
the defendant was induced to sign the deed of 1932 solely by
reason of the persuasion and misleading explanation of her
husband as to the feigned nature of the transfer; that she
never realized the full significance or import of the instrument, but that she had implicit trUst in her husband's management of their business affairs and accepted What he said
without question; and that the confidence she reposed in him
was betrayed in an attempt to consummate a conveyance of
their community real property to her detriment. Thus, there
was an absence of actual consent to the transfer on the part of
the defendant, and under the prevailing circumstances the
plaintiff is not in a position to urge the binding force Of the
defendant 'ssignature to the deed as an unchallengeable manifestation of assent to the conveyance. While it does not appear
that the plaintiff took part in the procurement of the deed
the equities of the case support the defendant's claim to re:
lief upon the basis of her husband's breach of his fiduciary
duty to protect her interests and the want of·consideration in
support of the transfer. From this aspect the present situation
is akin in principle to those cases wherein a gift, grant or be-'
quest obtained by undue influence of a third person is vitiated
thereby, and it is held immaterial that in the procurement
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thereof the immediate beneficiary did not participate. (Moore
v. Moore, 81 Cal. 195 [22 P. 589, 874] ; see cases collected in
96 A.L.R. 613-615.)
The majority opinion holds that these evidentiary matters
would have no bearing upon the determination or this appeal
because the defendant did not plead the fraudulent character
of the deed nor did the trial court make a finding based thereon. However, such omissions in the record do not militate
against the propriety of the judgment nullifying the operative
effect of the conveyance to the plaintiff in 1932~ In a quiet
title suit, unlike other actions generally, a defendant under b
general denial may raise the issue that the plaintiff acquired
title in whole or in part through a fraudulent transfer affecting her claim of title thereto. (12 Cal.Jur. §95, p. 1056;
Howe v. Johnson, 107 Cal. 67 [40P. 42] ; Banning v. Marleau,
121 Cal. 240 [53 P. 692]; Bird v. Murphy, 72 Cal.App.39
[236 P. 154] ; Sellers v. Neil, 47 Cal.App.2d 128 [117 P.2d
390].) Nor after consideration of this point was the trial court
required to make a special finding thereon. As previously
stated, the complaint and answer are in the conventional
style suitable to this type of litigation, and the findings are
responsive to the general form of the pleadings. The issue as
to the fraudulent nature of the conveyance arose merely in
the evidence at the trial. Findings of fact are sufficient if they
follow the language of the pleadings. (Dam v. Zink, 112 Cal.
91 [44 P. 331] ; Vasey v. Oampbell, 4 Cal.App. 451 [88 P.
509] ; Biurrun v. Elizalde, 75 Cal.App. 44 [242 P. 109] ; also,
see cases collected in 24 Cal.Jur. §213, p. 984.) Ownership of
the property by the defendant was the ultimate fact which
was alleged in the answer and which was set forth in the
findings. (Hitchcock v. Rooney, 171 Cal. 285 [152 P. 913] j
Hannah v. Oanty, 175 CaL 763 [167 P. 373].) In reviewing
the sufficiency of the findings to support a judgment, regard
will be had to the ultimate facts and not to mere 'probative
facts. (2 Cal.Jur. 872, and cases cited in Ten Year Supp.)
The majority opinion further holds that the defendant is
not now in a position to question the validity of the deed to
the plaintiff because the time limit of one year from the date
of recordation of the instrument, the period specified in section 172a as available for the wife's exercise of her right to
u.void an unauthorized conveyance, had expired several years
before the commencement of this quiet title action. However,

this statement of the law has no application .•hen the validity
of the deeq is questioned on the ground of. fraud rather than
non-compliance with the terms' of section 172a. A statute of
limitations is a special defense which may be either relied 0:0.
or waived at the election of a party entitled to avail herself
of it, and, if not specially made, it will be deemed to have
heen waived. (16 Cal.Jur. §232, p. 640; Estate of Garcelon,
104 Cal. 570 [38 P. 414, 43 Am.St.Rep. 134, 32 L.R.A. 595] ;
Bliss v. Sneath, 119 Cal. 526 [51 P. 848]:) Conceding that the
general form of the pleadings in this action did not permit the
plaintiff's assertion of a time limitation by formal plea and
that without such preliminary foundation she could have
urged such bar in the trial court in avoidance of the defendant's claim to relief, it does not appear from the record that
the plaintiff did in fact present the point there; Consequently
such matter should not be considered for the first time 6n appeal. (Estate of Garcelon, supra; Moore v. Oopp, 119 Cal.
429 [51 P. 630] j Bliss v. Sneath, supra.) The rule governing
such situation, where the formal plea of the statute of limita.-'
tions is unnecessary in order to introduce evidence thereon at
the trial, is stated in the case of Union Sugar 00. v. Hollister
Estate 00.,3 Cal.2d 740, 745 [47 P.2d 273] : "However, it
has been held that unless the adverse party invokes the plea
of the statute at the trial, and brings to the attention of the
trial court his purpose to offer evidence in support of such
plea, the court cannot assume that he desires to make any
such defense, and he cannot invoke the plea for the first time
.
on appeal. [Citing authorities.] '1
Consistent with this review of the record herein, the de-'
fendant is entitled to relief from the operative effect· of the
disputed conveyance. In my opinion the judgment should be
.
affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
19, 19~3. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a
rehearmg.

